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Abstract—Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are known to be
highly complex systems which can be applied to a variety of dif-
ferent environments, covering both civil and military application
domains. As CPS are typically complex systems, its design process
requires strong guarantees that the specified functional and non-
functional properties are satisfied on the designed application.
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) and high-level specification
languages are a valuable asset to help the design and evaluation
of such complex systems. However, when looking at the existing
MDE tool-support, it is observed that there is still little support
for the automated integration of formal verification techniques
in these tools. Given that formal verification is necessary to
ensure the levels of reliability required by safety critical CPS,
this paper presents an approach that aims to integrate the Model
Checking technique in the CPS design process for the purpose
of correctly analyzing temporal and safety characteristics. A tool
named ECPS Verifier was designed to support the model checking
integration into the design process, providing the generation of
timed automata models from high-levels specifications in AADL.
The proposed method is illustrated by means of the design of
an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, from where we derive the timed
automata models to be analyzed in the UPPAAL tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
Applications that integrate complex embedded software sys-
tems to control physical processes are widely known as Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS). The CPS design is a multidisciplinary
process that involves different teams working cooperatively
to address the application’s requirements. Adequate tools and
methods are of utmost importance to support and guide the
teams in order to increase the potential of the project success
[1]. To ensure the requirements fulfillment along the design
process, strong system analysis is needed [2].
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) has been considered ade-
quate to support CPS design. By using MDE, complementary
models can be created for representing the different system
dimensions. At least three different models should be used
for CPS design, including the physical behavior representa-
tion, the control system design, and the system architecture
specification [3], [4], [1].
Considering the typical high complexity of CPS and the
need for a strong analysis to ensure the design correctness,
formal verification becomes a natural candidate to become part
of the overall CPS design process [5]. There exists different
approaches therefore, like Model Checking (MC), Theorem
Proving, and Runtime Verification (RV). Each method has
its pros and cons, namely: MC suffers from the state ex-
plosion problem; Theorem Proving requires highly technical
knowledge and despite its latest developments it still faces
many automation problems (due to foundational limitations
on the supporting logical theories); and RV brings overhead
to the CPS since monitors have to be coupled with system
components and process extra information from events.
Aiming to avoid the state space explosion in Model Check-
ing, different design techniques can be applied. Examples
of these techniques include: abstractions and reduction of
unnecessary states; the use of symbolic model checking,
applying binary decision diagrams and symbolic algorithms;
the partial order reduction that concerns on the identification
of interleaving sequences, eliminating redundancy and so
reducing the state space.
Given this scenario, MC seems to be the more natural ap-
proach for our work since it conforms MDE practices and can
be fully automated. Well-known MC tools are UPPAAL [6],
HyTech [7], Kronos [8], among others. Given that UPPAAL
performance is much better than other tools like HyTech, and
Kronos in time and space [9]. In this context, on the present
work we adopt MC by using the UPPAAL tool [6].
In order to support the formal verification based on MC,
a timed automata should be created to express the system
behavior, supporting the evaluation of different properties such
as safety, reachability, liveness, and deadlock [10]. However,
generating these representations is not a simple task and
requires sufficient knowledge of the design team to correctly
express the system properties. To automate the timed automata
construction, it is our claim that a model transformation can
be performed using as input the architectural representation.
This paper presents an approach to apply a MC technique
on the CPS design process, allowing the timing and error
properties evaluation. The proposed approach includes a model
transformation process that based on the architectural model
in AADL [11], generates a Timed Automata representation
that conforms the UPPAAL tool [6]. The tool named ECPS
Verifier was created in the context of this proposal to support
such model transformation.
The reminder parts of this paper are organized as follows.
Section II describes the proposed activities to integrate the
formal verification method in the CPS design process. Section
III details the ECPS Verifier tool. Section IV presents the a
case study related to design of an Autonomous Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) by using the proposed approach. Section V discusses
the results obtained by performing the formal verification to
the UAV system. Section VI presents the related work. Finally,
Section VII presents our conclusions.
II. DESIGN METHOD AND ACTIVITIES
Aiming to support the evaluation of the CPS properties by
using MC a design method was created, allowing designers to
incorporate this technique on the CPS design process. In this
sense different properties from the system under design can
be evaluated, such as liveness, reachability, deadlock freeness,
and others. To support this method a tool named ECPS Verifier
was designed.
ECPS Verifier performs the model transformation from an
architectural model in AADL to a network of timed automata
devoted to be analyzed via MC. It is assumed the use of
AADL components designed in the OSATE tool to represent
the architectural model and the timed automata suited with the
UPPAAL tool to represent the system behavior.
An important aspect to be highlighted is that the problem
under consideration is not restricted to simply representing
the CPS behavior and analyzing its properties. It happens that
the designer must properly plan how to express the system
properties according to the proposed architecture and the set
of system devices, as well as to evaluate how correctly it
expresses the system properties in order to provide guarantees
that the system fulfills its restrictions.
The proposed design method consists in a set of activities to
be conducted by the designers to perform the model generation
and the evaluation of the system properties. These activities
are detailed in the following section.
A. Design Activities
The proposed method defines a sequence of activities to
integrate the MC in the CPS design process, allowing to
evaluate the system properties and restrictions. These activities
are presented in the Fig. 1, and aims to properly guide the
designers to define the system behavior and the possible device
faults, integrating these information on the architectural model
(by the use of AADL annexes) to support the MC evaluation.
In a nutshell, the method starts with an activity that targets
analyzing the possible CPS faults (Fault-trees design), having
as output the a fault-tree definition. Based on the defined faults,
a refinement is performed in the architectural model (Fault
properties integration on architectural model) by integrating
the fault’s characteristics. This activity is supported by using
the AADL Error Annex (EA) [12]. In addition, the threads
behavior are also evaluated, refining its properties by using
the AADL Behavioral Annex (BA) [13] (Behavior properties
refinement). The complete architectural model is used as input
to the model transformation process (Model transformation),
performed by the ECPS Verifier tool, generating the UPPAAL
automata. Then the system requirements are encoded as tem-
poral formulas in the UPPAAL syntax (Formal properties
specification), generating a complete UPPAAL model. Finally,
the system is evaluated (System analyzis).
Activity 1. Definition of fault-trees - In this activity, the
designer analyzes the CPS characteristics aiming to specify the
possible failure events. These information include the proposed
mission/task for the CPS, its configuration, the set of required
devices, and restrictions. The output of this activity is a set of
fault-trees to be used by the designers.
Based on the fault-trees it becomes possible to evaluate
the implications its events on the system behavior and define
alternatives to mitigate their effects. These representation aims
to provide a top view of the possible system failures that
should be considered during the design process.
Activity 2. Integration of fault properties in the architectural
model - By using the EA the fault-trees are added in the
architectural model, representing the possible failures, and
the associated probability for each error event occurrence.
These information is used to evaluate the failures impact
in the designed system, as well as to define alternatives to
mitigate their effects. The output of this activity is a refined
architectural model, integrating the error properties.
As the error properties, to provide the automata generation
the defined behavioral CPS properties needs to be refined.
Activity 3. Refinement of behavior properties in the archi-
tectural model - Based on the system characteristics in this
activity the behavioral properties are refined, by using the
AADL threads and the BA. In this way, properties are specified
such as execution states, system variables, system transitions,
subprograms access, and temporal characteristics. The output
of this activity is a complete architectural model, integrating
error and behavioral properties.
Regarding the usual AADL models design, its observed
that these models typically contain behavioral information that
allow designers to evaluate system properties. However, to
the timed automata extraction, some properties need to be
refined, adding information related to the automata guards and
variables declaration. Such complete AADL model is suitable
to be submitted to the transformation process.
Activity 4. Formal verification - In this activity the designers
perform the system evaluation based on the generated archi-
tectural model. This activity is divided into three sub-activities
(three last blocks from Fig. 1), that address each part of the
formal verification process.
The verification process is based on the timed automata
(UPPAAL model) that is generated by performing a model
transformation, which input is an AADL model.
Activity 4.1. Model transformation - An UPPAAL model
is created by means of a model transformation process from
the AADL specification. Such UPPAAL model is composed
by a set of templates that describe the AADL threads and
devices characteristics. The transformation is based on a set
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Fig. 1: ECPS Verifier Workflow.
of rules that map the source and target models, as detailed in
the Section III.
Activity 4.2. Formal properties specification - In this activity,
the designer creates formal expressions that represent model
properties that must be evaluated. These properties represent
the characteristics and restrictions that the system needs to
meet in order to fulfill its objective. In this sense properties
like liveness, reachability, safety, and deadlock occurrence can
be evaluated.
However, formally representing the system properties - in
this case using the UPPAAL syntax (and the UPPAAL-SMC
syntax for those properties that have probabilities associated)
- is not a simple task. This comes from the fact that these
expressions are dependent of the adopted formal language and,
in addition, describing the system restrictions using a formal
language is not trivial and requires considerable knowledge.
Activity 4.3. System analysis - The system analysis is
performed by checking the validity of the formally specified
properties carried out in Activity 4.2, against the models
derived in Activity 4.1. Depending on the results, system
changes may be required (which implies regenerating of, at
least, some of the existing automata), therefore adjusting the
system to satisfy its intended behaviors.
During the system properties evaluation it is possible to
observe if the system meets its requirements. This implies
that the system threads meet their deadlines, that the safety
properties are satisfied, and that no deadlocks are found except
if an error occurs. The performed analysis on the UAV system
is detailed in Section V.
III. MODEL TRANSFORMATION TOOL ECPS Verifier
To automate the UPPAAL model (automata) generation
from the AADL model, and to make this process less error
prone, we have developed a tool named ECPS Verifier. This
tool follows the MDE principles, which states that a mapping
between the source (AADL) and the target (UPPAAL) models
is defined by means of transformation rules. Auxiliary struc-
tures are required to provide the automata execution manage-
ment. The transformation rules make use of metamodels from
both source and target models, as further detailed.
A. Related Metamodels
The AADL (source) metamodel is composed by a root
System that contains a set of subcomponents representing
others AADL components, such as Processes, Threads, Ports,
and Connections. It is important to highlight that the Thread
component encapsulates the system behavior, so it can contain
subcomponents that may represent software calls (black-box
component) or it can detail the behavior by means of state
machines using the Behavior Annex (BA). Given that our
approach is more focused in the AADL software components,
the single hardware element under consideration is the Device.
Overall, the target metamodel is composed by a set of
templates that encapsulate the timed automata, and by a set
of queries used for the model evaluation. UPPAAL models
are composed by at least one template containing a timed
automata, which is decomposed into a set of states and tran-
sitions. These transitions can incorporate restrictions (guards
and synchronizations points), and can also incorporate actions
expressed like in imperative programming language - it allows
declaring variables and making function calls. Such actions
are defined in the updates definitions. Finally, a set of queries
describing the properties to be evaluated can also be attached
to the model.
Due to the lack of space, the created metamodels are not
illustrated in the paper but, however, they are available in the
ECPS Verifier repository1.
B. Transformation Process
To perform the transformation process, both a parser and a
transformation engined were created, all developed in Java as
plug-ins from Osate tool. The parser is responsible to mapp
to memory the source (AADL) textual model, in accordance
to its related metamodel elements.
The transformation engine is responsible to perform the
automata generation based on the source AADL model. This
engine is composed by the following rules:
• AADL Thread components are mapped to UPPAAL
templates representing its behavior and characteristics
like states, guards, invariants, periodicity, priority, and
others.
1https://github.com/fernandosgoncalves/ECPSVerifier/
• AADL Devices are also mapped as UPPAAL templates,
detailing its behavior coupled with its possible failures.
• The set of input and output ports from the AADL model
are used as basis to the variables and UPPAAL channels
declarations, representing the system communication.
The model for devices are initially composed by two states,
an idle and an execution state. The latter represents the
actuation (for actuators) or processing (for sensors). According
to its associated fault-tree, if it includes erroneous behavior,
additional states are included. Probabilities are associated to
each error state, representing the occurrence distribution of the
considered errors.
C. Scheduler Component and Auxiliary Functions
To support schedulability analysis using UPPAAL, a sched-
uler template was designed to be automatically included
into the UPPAAL model along the transformation process.
Thereby, designers only need to create in the AADL model a
device named Scheduler. Currently, only the Rate-Monotonic
(RM) scheduling algorithm [14] is supported. The template
automata model is presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Scheduler model.
When started (Init), the scheduler runs a function (initial-
ize()) that performs the tasks inclusion on the scheduling queue
according to their priorities and moves to state Free. At this
state its verified if the scheduler queue is empty (isEmpty()).
If so, the system waits for the next task activation (ready?),
on the NewTasks state. However, if the queue is not empty, the
task on the front of the queue (of highest priority) is selected.
So the task execution is started (Run state). If a new task is
available during another task’s execution (NewRequest state),
the scheduler comes to action and compares the priorities of
the running and the recently arrived task. If the running task
has higher priority, than the running task is resumed, otherwise
the running thread is preempted and the new task is executed.
To allow representing in the AADL model some required
UPPAAL properties - and ensuring the mapping between
UPPAAL properties and the AADL model, a few design
conventions were established. For instance, these conventions
involve AADL subprograms, which should be created to repre-
sent specific UPPAAL components, such as: (1) invariants; (2)
rate expressions; and (3) transition guards. It also requires the
addition of (4) functions to support the scheduling mechanism
and data types to represent (5) UPPAAL channels (chan) and
(6) clock variables (clock). An example of such set of AADL
subprograms is presented in Fig. 3.
Lines 2 to 5 represent the UPPAAL invariants, including
their names and invariants expression. Lines 7 to 11 represent
the UPPAAL transition guards - this is needed by the fact that
guards of the AADL BA do not support the use of functions in
the guards expression. Thereby, this subprogram is composed
by three inputs describing: the UPPAAL function that should
be declared as a subprogram, the guard operator, and the value
used in the expression.
1 -- ** SUBPROGRAMS **
2 SUBPROGRAM sp_invariant
3 FEATURES
4 state: IN PARAMETER String; inv: IN PARAMETER String;
5 END sp_invariant;
6
7 SUBPROGRAM sp_guard
8 FEATURES
9 function: in PARAMETER String; operator: in parameter String;
10 value: in parameter String;
11 END sp_guard;
12
13 -- ** SCHEDULER FUNCTION **
14 SUBPROGRAM sp_add
15 FEATURES id: IN PARAMETER;
16 END sp_add;
17
18 SUBPROGRAM sp_yield
19 END sp_yield;
20
21 SUBPROGRAM sp_head
22 END sp_head;
23
24 -- ** DATA TYPES ***
25 DATA chan END chan;
26
27 DATA clock EXTENDS Base_Types::Integer END clock;
Fig. 3: AADL design conventions.
The scheduler mechanism also requires a set of functions
to help its runtime engine, allowing it to: (1) add a new task
in the scheduler queue (lines 14 to 16); (2) yield the currently
running task (lines 18 to 19); (3) return the currently running
task (lines 21 to 22). The data types on lines 25 and 27
represent, respectively, the UPPAL channels - by convention
all channels are defined as broadcast - and the UPPAAL clock
variables.
Due to the fact that the AADL model can be composed by
multiple systems and implementations, it is here defined that
the first translated system will be the root. In this sense the
designer needs to declare first the root system in the AADL
file. Once the transformation is ended, the system becomes
suitable for MC. Although typical AADL models make use of
multiple source files, our approach only supports the use of a
single file.
It is important to highlight that besides some design conven-
tions can be adopted, in order to provide the models mapping,
its verified that the AADL model support the representation
of required structures to provide automata generation. In this
sense, regarding that during the architectural model construc-
tion the threads behavior is specified using the BA, and that
the model has a high information refinement, its possible to
say that only the design conventions needs to be included on
the AADL base model to enable the transformation process.
IV. DESIGN OF SENSING AND ACTUATION SUBSYSTEMS
OF AN UAV
The application of the activities presented in the previous
section is illustrated here by means of the design - and
verification - of the sensing and actuation subsystems of an
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Such UAV was conceived
in a related project named ProVant1.
Overall, the UAV design was conducted by the use of the
design method proposed in [15]. Such design comprised the
creation of a Simulink functional model for the control system,
and of an AADL architectural model to represent the UAV
embedded system. The designed architectural model is used
as basis to the approach presented in this paper.
The top-level view of the UAV architectural model is
depicted in Fig. 4. This model integrates the control system
(managed by the pi_control_system process, line 4) with the
sensing and actuation subsystems (managed by the pi_est_act
process, line 5). Coupled with these processes are the set of
system devices (lines 7 to 10) that represent the required UAV
sensors and actuators.
1 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION UAV.impl
2 SUBCOMPONENTS
3 --PROCESS
4 pi_control_system: PROCESS p_control_system.impl;
5 pi_est_act: PROCESS p_est_act.impl;
6 --DEVICE
7 di_esc_r: DEVICE d_esc.impl; di_esc_l: DEVICE d_esc.impl;
8 di_servo_r: DEVICE d_servo.impl; di_servo_l: DEVICE
d_servo.impl;
9 di_gps: DEVICE d_gps.impl; di_sonar: DEVICE d_sonar.impl;
10 di_imu: DEVICE d_imu.impl;
11 CONNECTIONS
12 C1: PORT di_gps.position -> pi_est_act.position;
... Here goes all others connections (lines 13 to 32)
33 END UAV.impl;
Fig. 4: UAV model with sensing and actuation process.
Fig. 5 contains the expansion of the sensing and actuation
process (pi_est_ act). It is possible to observe the set of threads
that are responsible for interfacing with these devices, sending
the control references to actuators (thread ti_signalTrans for-
mation, line 5) and providing the system behavior estimation
(threads ti_sensing and ti_positionEst, lines 3 and 4).
1 PROCESS IMPLEMENTATION p_est_act.impl
2 SUBCOMPONENTS
3 ti_sensing: THREAD t_sensing.impl;
4 ti_positionEst: THREAD t_positionEst.impl;
5 ti_signalTransformation: THREAD t_signalTransformation.impl;
6 CONNECTIONS
7 C1: PORT distance -> ti_behaviorEst.distance;
... Here goes all others connections (lines 8 to 25)
26 END p_est_act.impl;
Fig. 5: AADL representation of sensing and
actuation process.
To be analyzed using MC, the designed AADL model must
be subject of the activities presented in section II, as follows.
Initially, fault-trees are designed to detail the possible fail-
ures that can be associated to the systems devices (Activity
1). Regarding the UAV devices, fault-trees were defined for
the Servomotors, Electronic Speed Controllers (ESCs), Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU), Global Positioning System (GPS),
and Sonar. Fig. 6 presents the fault-tree designed for the GPS,
containing information extracted from its datasheet [16].
1http://provant.paginas.ufsc.br
Considering our focus on design of the UAV software com-
ponents, at this time only the logical failures are considered
(dark blue blocks of Fig. 6). These failures are flagged by the
device, sending in the message package a specific bit to each
kind of reported error. The designed faults-trees are also based
on the works related to UAV faults presented in [17], [18].
Based on the preliminary AADL model presented in Fig. 4,
The specified fault properties are integrated on the AADL
model presented in Fig. 4 by using the AADL EA, increasing
the model details (Activity 2). Fig. 7 shows the GPS EA
specification according to its fault-tree.
Regarding the behavior specification coupled with the de-
vices error properties, the threads behavior properties are
analyzed and extended if required (Activity 3). In this activity
the designers detail some properties such as the threads states,
transitions, guards, the subprograms access, temporal char-
acteristics, among others. The proposed design conventions
can be used at this time, in order to provide a proper model
mapping. The behavioral characteristics are presented in the
Fig. 8, detailing: the thread periodicity; the execution time;
its period; the thread priority; its deadline (lines 3 and 4); the
thread variables (line 7); the set of execution states (lines 9 to
10); and the set of system transitions (lines 12 to 31).
Once the AADL model becomes properly complemented, it
is subject of model transformation to be further analyzed using
MC (Activity 4). In this way, the UPPAAL timed automata is
generated by using the proposed transformation tool. As result,
the UAV system is mapped into a set of templates. Fig. 9
depicts a template structure representing the UAV position
thread that is responsible to provide the GPS interface and
to estimate the system position.
It can be observed in this template the set of predefined
properties previously detailed on the AADL model. This in-
cludes characteristics like the thread’s periodicity, the devices
interface, the scheduler functions, among others. Regarding
the UAV devices, the GPS sensor has an interface with the
presented thread. In this sense, the generated template that
represents this sensor structure is shown in Fig. 10.
Regarding the GPS model its observed the set of main
execution states (idle and processing), as well as the coupling
of the processing state with the predefined set of possible
failures and its probabilities of occurrence.
Once the automata representations are generated, the de-
signer needs to formally define the set of properties that will
be evaluated (Activity 4.2), thus they need to define them as
UPPAAL queries. These queries are written by the use of
TCTL language and detail properties like reachability, safety,
and deadlock freeness for example. A detailed definition of
the system queries is presented in Section V.
In terms of the system analysis, the UPPAAL tool performs
a state space exploration to validate the designed queries. The
system evaluation also includes queries related with defined
probabilities, by the use of UPPAAL-SMC. The details related
to the performed system analysis on the UAV system are
detailed in the following section.
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Fig. 6: GPS fault tree representation.
1 ERROR BEHAVIOR gpsError
2 EVENTS
3 processorError : error event; delayedData : error event;
4 incorrectData : error event; dataLoss : error event;
5 romError : error event; invalidFirmware : error event;
6 STATES
7 operational : initial state; partialOperation: state;
8 emergencyMode : state; irreversibleFailure : state;
9 TRANSITIONS
10 T1 : operational -[ delayedData ]-> partialOperation;
11 T2 : operational -[ incorrectData ]-> partialOperation;
12 T3 : operational -[ dataLoss ]-> partialOperation;
13 T4 : operational -[ romError ]-> emergencyMode;
14 T5 : operational -[ processorError ]-> irreversibleFailure;
15 T6 : operational -[ invalidFirmware ]-> irreversibleFailure;
16 END BEHAVIOR;
Fig. 7: AADL GPS error representation.
V. UAV PROPERTIES EVALUATION
In this section we present the preliminary experiments
carried out in the UAV system while formulating the method
described in this paper. These experiments involved mostly
two efforts: i) the construction of the various timed automata,
including those presented in Figs. 10 and 9. They captured,
respectively, the GPS properties and the task that is responsible
for providing the UAV position; ii) the specification of the
relevant properties of the UAV model covering safety, liveness,
respect of deadlines, and causes for deadlocks.
In the rest of this section it is presented some examples of
the UPPAAL specifications that were developed and checked.
a) (Example-Spec-1): All tasks run at least once, and
therefore reach a state where they are idle. This liveness
property is, as expected, only partially fulfilled since a task
can reach an error state (e.g., due to a device or a function
failure) during its execution. It is expressed by the following
UPPAAL formula, where T1 . . . Tk denote all the model tasks.
E <> (T1.Idle and . . . and Tk.Idle), (1)
b) (Example-Spec-2): Whatever the task we consider,
that task in executing only if the scheduler is running or pro-
cessing a new request. This safety condition imposes therefore
that not exits task running out of the scheduler control, and is
expressed as:
A[ ] not (φ and not (Scheduler.Run or Scheduler.NewRequest)), (2)
such that φ specifies all possible task states that correspond-
ing its execution. The way to state this for a specific Ti is
through the term
φ = (Ti.State1 or . . . or Ti.Statek) , (3)
where Ti represents a system thread, i represents a task in
[0, N ] and N define the number of tasks. The State_k denotes
their execution states (which are a subset of task execution
states).
c) (Example-Spec-3): Considering the set of system
tasks, a task is running only if its execution time is smaller
than it is deadline. This is expressed by the following formula:
A[ ] not (forall (i : int[0, N ])((Ti.State1 or . . . or Ti.Statek) and
(Ti.ax > D[i]))) (4)
where Ti represents system threads, D[i] its prescribed
deadline, the ax field its current total execution time, and each
State1, . . . , Statek represent task execution states.
d) (Example-Spec-4): A system deadlock is possible
only if one of the system threads is on error state. This property
was checked by specifying the formula scheme:
A[ ] deadlock imply (T1.Error or · · · or Ti.Error) (5)
with T1 . . . Ti denoting the tasks of the system, and deadlock
is UPPAAL’s keyword that denotes that there is a deadlock
in the model.
e) (Example-Spec-5): As a final example we define a
specification that brings statistical analysis of the model. For
this, we used the Statistical Model Checking (SMC) facilities
that the version of UPPAAL that we have adopted.
This specification refers to the probability of the system
to reach an actuator error state due to its execution. This
probability condition is expressed by the formula:
Pr [ ≤ 12000] (<> Actuator(i).EmergencyMode), (6)
where the bound defined (≤ 12000) represents the thread
period that interface with this actuator and Actuator(i) de-
notes the ith system actuator. For instance, when considering
Actuator(0) (named ESC right in the UAV model), this
property is satisfied with a probability in [0.107051, 0.206887]
with confidence 0.95.
Regarding the UAV properties evaluation, overall, forty two
properties were analyzed on different categories including,
reachability, safety, liveness, and deadlock freeness. Half of
them evaluate the probabilities associated with the error states
providing estimations with 95% of confidence. The remaining
properties cover the more general characteristics where it is
observed that 52.38% of these properties are totally satisfied
and 47.62% of these properties may be satisfied. These results
1 THREAD IMPLEMENTATION t_positionEst.impl
2 PROPERTIES
3 dispatch_protocol => periodic; compute_execution_time => 9000 us .. 10000 us;
4 period => 100000 us; Priority => 3; deadline => 100000 us;
5 ANNEX BEHAVIOR_SPECIFICATION {**
6 VARIABLES
7 thTimer : clock; ttTime : clock; cf : integer;
8 STATES
9 readyState : initial state; error : complete final state; idle : state; blocked : state;
10 msgReceive : state; msgSend : state; gpsInterface : state; positionEstimation : state;
11 TRANSITIONS
12 T1 : readyState -[]-> msgReceive {cf := 0; thTimer := 0; run?; invariant!("msgreceive","thTimer<100000"); guard!("head()", "==","id")};
13 T2 : msgReceive -[errorOccurred!=1 and thTimer>=125]-> gpsInterface {rund_imuimpl!; cf :=1; thTimer:=0; invariant!("gpsInterface","thTimer<100000")};
... here goes others thread transition lines 14 to 31.
32 END t_positionEst.impl
Fig. 8: AADL position thread behavior.
Fig. 9: Position estimation task.
Fig. 10: GPS template.
are indeed according to our expectations since due to the
nature of the specifications, these may not be satisfied due
to the possibility of leading to an error state of the system.
The obtained results with the UAV model showed that the
system meets its requirements. This implies that the system
threads meet their deadlines, the safety properties are satisfied,
and no deadlocks are founded except if an error occurs.
VI. RELATED WORKS
The present section details the works that relate to our
proposal, either because they also make use of MDE premises,
or because they provide means to support the evaluation of
system properties using model checking.
An approach designed to the construction of on-board
computer-based aerospace systems named COMPASS is pre-
sented in [19]. The authors propose a co-engineering process
focused on the specification and analysis of these systems.
COMPASS models are designed using the SLIM language,
which is a subset of AADL that includes natively on the
language some behavioral properties from the AADL BA. The
proposed tool provides support for model checking, therefore
SLIM model needs to be translated into a Labeled Transition
System (LTS). It supports the evaluation of properties such
as safety, correctness, and dependability analysis. The major
weakness of this approach comes from the fact that AADL
specifications are not fully supported (due the use of SLIM).
A model transformation approach to generate Timed Ab-
stract State Machines (TASM) from AADL models is pre-
sented in [20]. TASM also uses the UPPAAL tool to make
model checking. The major weakness from this approach
relates to fact that no hardware elements are taken into
consideration (e.g. Devices) and that there is no support for
probabilistic model checking.
In [21] the authors propose a set of steps to allow perform-
ing the system specification integrated with formal verification.
Therefore, AADL models are translated to an intermediary lan-
guage named Fiacre. The transformation omits the hierarchical
information of the AADL syntax and concentrates on the
threads execution and communication. In order to support MC,
the Fiacre model is then compiled into a format for the Tina
tool to allow formal verification using LTL formulations. From
the present work perspective, the major weakness from this
approach comes from the fact that AADL EA specifications
are not covered in the transformation process to Fiacre.
In [5] it is presented another approach that aims to sup-
port timed automata generation from AADL, also using the
UPPAAL tool for model checking. Therefore an annex to
the AADL language is proposed to support properties speci-
fication. It is observed that the authors did not detailed the
transformation process, i.e., which AADL components are
used for the timed automata generation. The transformation
rules are also not detailed, including the fact that it is unclear
whether the proposal is supported by a tool or should be
manually performed.
Analyzing the related works it is observed that they consist
mostly in applying MC over AADL models. However, these
works provide only partial support regarding the AADL lan-
guage coverage, to extract the timed automata, and require
multiple transformation processes to support the properties
evaluation. Some approaches include characteristics that could
complement our approach, like the SLIM language [19] and its
abstraction capacity for models construction without requiring
the usage of AADL annexes. On the other hand, our proposed
method can be used to complement approaches like [19], [20],
[21], and [5], given that we allow representing the devices
characteristics (using the AADL EA).
Approaches such as [20] and [21] are focused on detailing
the software components of the AADL model. In [5] the
authors propose a language extension to provide the automata
properties representation. In our approach, the designers can
represent the system threads, the set of required functions, and
the possible device failures directly on the native language.
This results in more complete models, which are suitable for
more detailed analysis.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented an approach to integrate formal veri-
fication in the CPS design process. It consists of performing
model transformation of AADL models to a timed automata
representation that is suitable to be analyzed using model
checking (MC). The transformation process is supported by
a developed tool named ECPS Verifier and MC can be
performed using the UPPAAL tool.
Comparing to the related works, it is observed the partial
compliance of their transformation process in respect to the
designed architectural models. Most of the time the generated
models require manual intervention from the designers in order
to incorporate additional features such as threads behavior and
error properties. In this sense, the present proposal provides
means to represent the required system characteristics to sup-
port the complete timed automata extraction and its evaluation.
An observed difficulty for using our proposal relates to
formally representing the system properties to be evaluated.
Currently it must be done using UPPAAL and UPPAAL-
SMC syntaxes, which requires a high level of expertise. Our
intention is investigating solutions to simplify the properties
specification. For instance, we plan to evaluate the integration
of the property patterns defined in [22].
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